The Theory of Learning in Games读书介绍
| 类别 | 页数 | 译者 | 网友评分 | 年代 | 出版社 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 书籍 | 292页 | 1998 | The MIT Press |
| 定价 | 出版日期 | 最近访问 | 访问指数 |
|---|---|---|---|
| USD 45.00 | 1998-05-22 … | 2022-04-19 … | 22 |
In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems.
In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
朱·弗登伯格（Drew Fudenberg），哈佛大学经济系教授。1981年毕业于麻省理工学院，获得经济学博士学位。主要研究领域为博弈论和动态经济学。曾在加州大学伯克利分校、麻省理工学院、斯坦福大学和法国图卢兹大学任教。
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